INTRODUCTION
Among the more surprising results in game theory is that a proper equilibrium in a normal form game induces a sequential equilibrium in Ž every corresponding extensive form van Damme, 1984, and Kohlberg and . Mertens, 1986 . The converse, however, can be false: a strategy profile can be sequential in every extensive form with a given normal form without being proper. Proper equilibrium is thus stronger than sequential-inevery-tree. What is the difference between the two, and how much stronger is proper equilibrium?
The paper addresses these questions by exploring the relationship between proper equilibrium and two other concepts: quasi-perfect in every Ž . tree and strategic independence respecting equilibrium SIRE . Quasi-per-Ž . fect equilibrium, which van Damme 1984 defined and showed is implied by proper equilibrium, is an extensive-form concept closely related to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
1 Strategic independence respecting equilibrium is a normal-form concept that is, we argue, the appropriate decision-Ž theoretic description of sequential rationality a key element of sequential-. 2 ity .
We begin by showing that properness is equivalent to quasi-perfect-inevery-tree: A converging sequence of perturbed normal form strategy profiles supports its limit as a proper equilibrium if and only if the sequence of strategies induced in every corresponding extensive form supports its limit as a quasi-perfect equilibrium. 3 We thus obtain an extensive-form characterization of the distinction between properness and sequentiality, since quasi-perfection requires players to act optimally against each term in the sequence of opponents' strategies, while sequential equilibrium requires optimality only against the limit of this sequence.
While the difference in the definitions of quasi-perfection and sequentiality is easy to understand, the differences in the implications of those definitions are more subtle. In particular, sequential rationality is often described as the requirement that, at every information set, a player's choice makes sense if that information set is reached, even if the player Ž learns something unexpected about the play of her opponents i.e., the . information set is off the play path . In contrast, quasi-perfection seems to 1 It differs from extensive-form trembling-hand perfection in that, at each information set, the player choosing an action ignores the possibility of her own future mistakes.
2 Ž Both sequential equilibrium in the extensive form and SIRE like most existing solution . concepts impose rather strong cross-player consistency conditions on beliefs. We will not try to argue that these conditions are natural. 3 A key ingredient in this result is the requirement that the same sequence be used in all corresponding extensive forms. The result is false without the restriction that the same Ž . sequence is used in all corresponding extensive forms see Hillas, 1996 . have little to do with the information a player learns about her opponents during play. 4 Moreover, every extensive-form game used in the proof of the equivalence of proper and quasi-perfection has the property that each player receives no information about the play of her opponents. 5 Since sequential rationality appears to depend in a central way on the notion of information, while quasi-perfection does not, our extensive-form characterization is an incomplete description of the relationship between properness and sequential-in-every-tree.
The remainder of the paper is concerned with a normal-form characterization of the relationship between properness and sequential-in-every-tree. The requirement that planned actions at an information set make sense when that information set is reached seems intrinsically an extensive-form Ž . Ž . notion. However, Mailath et al. 1993 henceforth MSS argue that this is not so: statements about ''when'' an action will matter can be translated into statements about ''if an action matters.'' That is, sequential rationality can be rephrased as the requirement that a decision that only matters for a given subset of strategies by the opponents should be made as if a strategy from that subset had been chosen. In the normal form, the phrase ''only matters for a given subset of strategies by the opponents'' comes down to a particular pattern of payoff ties for the player making the decision. We call this pattern of ties a strategic independence. Like an information set in an extensive form, a strategic independence captures a situation in which a player can uncouple her decision into two parts, one of which is relevant if the information set is reached, and one if it is not. 6 Ž Requiring sequential rationality in the normal form optimal play in the . limit at all strategic independences yields strategic independence respecting equilibrium. The normal-form characterization of the relationship between proper and sequential equilibria then involves two elements: the connection between sequential-in-every-tree and SIRE, and the connection between SIRE and proper. 4 Sequentiality is more sensitive than quasi-perfection to the information structure of extensive-form games. Consider the following two-player game of perfect information: Player I chooses ''Out'' or ''In''; the game ends after O yielding payoffs 0 and 1 to players I and II, Ä 4 Ž . respectively; and player II has two possible actions A, C after I, with I, A yielding payoffs Ž . 1 and 0 and I, C yielding payoffs y1 and y1 to players I and II, respectively. The only Ž . sequential equilibrium is I, A . However, in the simultaneous-move extensive-form game in which player II does not know if player I has chosen I when choosing between A and C, Ž . Ž . O,C is also a sequential equilibrium. In contrast, only I, A is quasi-perfect in either extensive form.
5 This does not mean that the dynamic structure of the extensive form is irrelevant. The Ž . different extensive forms are used to force players to make choices between and so rank every pair of strategies.
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A strategic independence for player i is a subset of strategy profiles, X = X , and is i yi reached if the opponents' choices are in X .
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The connection between sequential-in-every-tree and SIRE is straightforward: In an extensive form, if an information set is not reached, not only is the decision maker indifferent about her choice at that information set, but all other players are indifferent as well. In contrast, a strategic independence in the normal form is defined solely in terms of the payoffs to the decision maker. A strategic independence for which the payoff ties also hold for the other players is called a normal form information set. Requiring sequential rationality only at normal form information sets rather than at all strategic independences yields normal form sequential equilibrium. MSS show that an assessment induces a sequential equilibrium in every extensive form with a given reduced normal form if and only if it constitutes a normal form sequential equilibrium in that reduced normal form. The difference between SIRE and sequential-in-every-tree is thus the difference between sequential rationality at all strategic independences and sequential rationality only at those strategic independencies satisfying the extra condition on other players' payoffs. From the point of view of the decision maker, payoff ties for the other players are irrelevant and so there is no decision-theoretic reason to distinguish between the different strategic independences. Hence, SIRE is the appropriate decision-theoretic formulation of sequential rationality.
The relationship between proper and SIRE is the normal-form analog of the relationship between quasi-perfection and sequentiality. In particular, properness is equivalent to optimal play along the sequence at all strategic independences, while SIRE requires optimality against the limit.
We next turn to the decision-theoretic foundations of SIRE and proper. Ž . Blume et al. 1991b provide a decision-theoretic characterization of proper Ž . equilibrium in terms of lexicographic probability systems LPSs . We provide a similar decision-theoretic characterization of SIRE. Ž . In the Blume et al. 1991b characterization, a proper equilibrium can be viewed as the result of players' ranking their strategies according to a Ž . lexicographic probability system i.e., a hierarchy of beliefs over the play of their opponents, where the hierarchy of beliefs reflects the opponents' payoffs in an intuitive manner. A player first consults her first-level belief about opponents' play and ranks her strategies according to their expected payoffs given this belief. If any indifferences occur, the player appeals to her second-level beliefs, breaking indifferences according to their expected payoffs against this belief. Further indifferences are appealed to a thirdlevel belief, and so on. This process continues until either all indifferences have been broken or sufficiently many beliefs have been encountered that their supports exhaust the opponents' strategy spaces.
Like proper, SIRE can be viewed as a ranking of strategies driven by a hierarchy of beliefs about opponents' play. However, in a SIRE a player appeals an indifference to the next level only if it is a structural indiffer-ence, that is, if the player's indifference is caused by ties in the payoff Ž matrix as opposed to an indifference created by a fortuitous belief about . 7 opponents' play . The decision-theoretic difference between SIRE and properness thus hinges on how they treat cases in which players are indifferent between strategies.
Our last result compares properness and sequentiality in terms of trembles, but without reference to information sets or strategic indepen-Ž . dences. We show that the structural ordering underlying SIRE ranks player i's strategy r ahead of s if and only if r receives a higher payoff drawn from a particular subset of such sequences. Both proper and SIRE are characterized in terms of optimal behavior against sequences of trembles, but the set of sequences of trembles is different. 8 The conditions for properness to rank a pair of strategies are weaker than the corresponding conditions for SIRE, and so properness accordingly imposes more restrictions on strategy choices than does SIRE.
The following section introduces notation. Section 3 presents the extensive-form characterization of proper equilibrium in terms of quasi-perfection, and so the characterization of the difference between properness and sequentiality in terms of optimality along a sequence of perturbations versus optimality in the limit. Section 4 introduces strategic independences and SIRE. Lexicographic belief systems and the strategy orderings underlying properness and SIRE are described in Section 5. Section 6 characterizes these strategy orderings in terms of sequences of perturbed strategies.
PRELIMINARIES
Ž . We denote the set of players by N and player i's pure strategy set by < < S , i g N, with S -ϱ. Typical strategies for player i are denoted r , s , . indifference only on the part of the player making the decision . 8 There is, as far we know, no corresponding tremble characterization of the ordering described in footnote 7 for normal form sequential equilibrium. 
We use the term agree for player i on X to emphasize that player i is yi indifferent between r and s for any fixed strategy profile, s , of the other
players in X , but other players might not be. Note that these indifferyi ences are due to the structure of payoff ties in the game, and do not depend on some particular mixed strategy profile of the other players. We will accordingly say that r and s are structurally indifferent on X . treating the set of pure strategies that agree on S as a single strategy.
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For any mixture on PRNF strategy profiles P, we also let P denote the mixture on normal-form strategies obtained by dividing the probability attached to each PRNF strategy equally among the corresponding normal-form strategies.
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ÄŽ n . ϱ 4 A probability sequence, P , i g N , is a collection of independent i ns1 probability distributions such that each P n is a completely mixed probabili ity distribution on S . Given a probability sequence, we define P n and P n i yi n Ž . n Ž . n Ž . in the obvious manner, i.e., P s s Ł P s and P s s
Ä n 4 Ł P s . We say that the probability sequence P is conditionally
and all its marginals are n Ž < . n Ž . n Ž . convergent sequences, where P s X ' P s rP X for s g X and zero otherwise. We sometimes refer to converging probability sequences as ''trembles'' or ''sequences of perturbed strategy profiles. '' 9 A PRNF strategy need not imply unique choices in an extensive form, because different actions at an extensive form information set may be consistent with the same PRNF strategy. This ambiguity is unimportant because the differing actions consistent with a given PRNF strategy profile do not affect any players' payoffs. Hence, any other completely-mixed division of the probability among corresponding normal form strategies could have been chosen. Myerson, 1978 . A strategy profile is proper if there Ä n 4 n Ä 4 is a probability sequence P with lim P s and a sequence ⑀ , n ⑀ ª 0, such that, for all i and all r , s g S ,
Ä n 4 By taking subsequences, we can always ensure that P is conditionally convergent. If is a proper equilibrium and P n is the probability Ž .
Ä n 4 sequence satisfying 1 , then we say that is supported by P .
AN EXTENSIVE-FORM CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERNESS
This section characterizes the difference between the equilibrium concepts of sequential-in-every-tree and properness. Sequential-in-every-tree Ž . requires strategies at every information set in every tree to be best responses to the limits of sequences of opponents' strategies. Properness require strategies at every information set to be best responses to all of the terms in the sequence of perturbed strategies.
The extensive-form equilibrium concept used to characterize proper equilibrium is that of a quasi-perfect equilibrium: van Damme, 1984 . A conditionally convergent probabil-Ä n 4 ity sequence P with limit induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in an extensive form game ⌫ if, for the corresponding sequence of completely mixed behavior strategies b n and limit b ϱ , for each player i and information set h for that player, contingent on having reached h, b ϱ is a best i reply to b n for all n.
yi Quasi-perfection is closely related to sequentiality: sequentiality is obtained by replacing ''b ϱ is a best reply to b n for all n'' in the above
requires best replies, at all information sets, to the limits of a perturbed sequence of opponents' strategies, while quasi-perfection requires best replies, at all information sets, to each element of the sequence of perturbed strategies. Ž . Extensive-form trembling-hand perfection hereafter, perfection requires player i to play a best response at every information set to the perturbed strategies of her opponents and to perturbed versions of her own continuation strategies. Quasi-perfection, on the other hand, forces player i to ignore the perturbations in her own strategies. As a result, there is no inclusion relationship between perfection and quasi-perfection. The two standard examples illustrating this are in Fig. 1 . In the extensive
form in Fig. 1a , LL is quasi-perfect, but not perfect, while in that of Fig.  1b , RL is perfect, but not quasi-perfect. A quasi-perfect equilibrium must be sequential, but the converse fails.
It would be consistent with common usage to characterize a strategy Ž . profile of the PRNF S, as inducing a quasi-perfect equilibrium in an Ž . extensive form with that PRNF if there exists a sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles whose limit is equivalent to and is a Ä n 4 quasi-perfect equilibrium. In contrast, we have defined a sequence P as Ä n 4 inducing a quasi-perfect equilibrium in an extensive form if P yields a sequence of completely mixed behavior strategies that converges to a limit that, together with the sequence, satisfies the conditions for quasi-perfec-Ä n 4 tion. Thus, when P induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form with a given PRNF, the strategy sequences supporting the quasi-perfect equilibrium in the different extensive forms are derived from the same sequence of completely mixed PRNF strategies.
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While a proper equilibrium need not induce a perfect equilibrium in Ž . every extensive form LL in the extensive form in Fig. 1a , for example , a proper equilibrium does induce a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every exten-Ž . sive form van Damme, 1984 . Our first result is that this property characterizes proper equilibria: 11 10 Figures 11᎐13 in MSS describe a simple example of a pair of extensive forms with the same normal form with the property that a strategy profile can be supported as a sequential Ž . equilibrium in each extensive form, but only by using different trembles. Hillas 1996 contains an example of a strategy profile that is not proper, and yet can be supported by Ž . necessarily different trembles as a quasi-perfect in every tree.
11 In a previous version, we stated this proposition with the additional assumption of Ž . transference of decision maker indifference see footnote 16 . We are grateful to John Hillas Ž . for pointing out that our proof did not require this assumption. Also, see Hillas 1996 for a different proof of this theorem.
Ä n 4 PROPOSITION 1. A conditionally con¨ergent probability sequence P on S induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in e¨ery extensi¨e form with PRNF Ž . Ä n 4 S, if and only if the limit of P is a proper equilibrium supported by
The proof of this proposition begins with a straightforward reformula-Ž . tion of proper equilibrium whose proof is omitted : LEMMA 1. The strategy profile is a proper equilibrium if and only if Ä n 4 n there exists a conditionally con¨ergent probability sequence P , with lim P Ä 4 s and a sequence E , ⑀ ª 0, such that, for all i and all r , s g X ,
Ä n 4 equilibrium in every tree. Since P is completely mixed, it can be viewed as a completely mixed behavior strategy profile. Fix a pair of strategies s i and r for player i such that
The trivial extensive form representation of the PRNF, interpreted as a < < simultaneous move game, has one information set for each player, with S j choices for player j. Let ⌫ denote the extensive form obtained from this trivial extensive form by the following application of the ''coalesce'' transformation: Replace the single information set of player i with two sequen-< < tial choices, the first information set has S y 1 actions, corresponding to Ä n 4 Ž . between r and s . Since P induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in ⌫, 3
Ž . found such that 2 is satisfied, and so is proper. w x Ž . IF This is Theorem 1 in van Damme 1984 . B Thus, the distinction between properness and sequential-in-every-tree is that properness requires optimality along the sequence, while the latter only requires optimality in the limit. One of the attractive aspects of Proposition 1 is that it gives a characterization of properness that involves optimal play against a sequence of perturbed strategies, rather than Ž . condition 1 , which only requires almost-optimal play. This characteriza-Ž tion does, however, require considering different extensive forms with the . same PRNF . The key step in the proof of Proposition 1 involves finding, for every pair of strategies for each player i, an extensive form in which player i chooses from just these two strategies while all other players still have all of their strategies available. For any pair of strategies, there are extensive forms with such an information set, but, in general, there is no extensive form that captures all of these information sets for all players Ž . 12 see Mailath et al., 1994 , Section III, for a canonical example .
SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY

Strategic Independence Respecting Equilibrium
The idea behind sequential equilibrium, optimality at every information set, is often phrased in terms of restrictions on the behavior of a player when he is asked to make a decision. This suggests that an important feature of the structure in an extensive form game is that a player need not make a decision until required to by the realized play of the game. In MSS, we argued that this is incorrect: it is not that the choice of an action at an information set need not be made until that information set is reached that is important, but rather that the choice of action, whene¨er taken, Ž . ''matters'' i.e., affects the outcome of the game only if that information set is reached. Hence, whether a player makes a decision at an information set or makes an ex ante contingency plan, the player's action for that information set can be made as if the information set in question has been or will be reached. Sequential equilibrium requires that this choice be a best response to some belief about opponents' play given that the information set in question is reached.
The normal form structure that captures situations in which a player can make a decision as if he knew that his opponents had chosen from a particular subset of their strategies was called a strategic independence in MSS: DEFINITION 4. The set X : S is strategically independent for player i if 1. X s X = X , and
and t and s agree for player i on S _ X .
The distinction between properness and sequential-in-every-tree is reminiscent of that between trembling hand perfection and sequentiality in a given tree. Moreover, generically Ž . in extensive form payoffs the latter two coincide. This suggests that, in some sense, generically, proper and sequential-in-every-tree coincide. However, since we must deal simultaneously with several extensive forms at the same time, the description of the Ž . appropriate genericity requirement is a subtle issue. Section 10 of Mailath et al. 1995 discusses this issue in some detail.
Suppose The decision-theoretic analog of requiring best replies at all information sets is requiring best replies at all strategic independences:
Ä n 4 DEFINITION 5. The limit of a conditionally convergent sequence P is a strategic independence respecting equilibrium if for all i and any strategic n Ž < . independence X for player i, lim P и X is a best reply from among the i i n Ž< . elements of X to lim P и X , i.e., for all r , s g X ,
Ž .
As usual, we say that the strategic independence respecting equilibrium Ä n 4 is supported by the sequence P . Some examples are discussed in Section 5.3.
As a second manifestation of the limit of optima vs. optima of limits distinction, we note:
LEMMA 2. A strategy profile is proper if and only if there is a
Ä n 4 n conditionally con¨ergent probability sequence P , with lim P s , and a Ä 4 sequence ⑀ , ⑀ ª 0, such that, for all i, all strategic independences X for i, n n and all r , s g X ,
Ž . and s X which agree on S _ X , so that an X -equivalence class can be chosen without
. Since X is a strategic independence, there exists i i yi yi t gX that agrees with s on S _ X and agrees with r on X . Then
giving the result. w x Ä 4 IF Since X ' r , s = S is a strategic independence for player i, and
, the result follows from Lemma 1.
Ž . Condition 5 implies that if there exists an n* such that the antecedent Ž . n Ž < .
14 of 5 holds for all n ) n*, then lim P s X s 0. The definition of
SIRE is thus the limit of the characterization in Lemma 2: proper equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of strategies, each element of which satisfies an optimality property, while SIRE requires optimality only with respect to the limiting strategies induced by such a sequence. 15 This also implies, of course, that a proper equilibrium is a SIRE, and so SIRE exist.
Sequential-in-E¨ery-Tree
If the definition of a strategic independence is strengthened by requiring agree for all players, rather than just agree for player i, then the resulting normal form structure is called a normal form information set. This structure is the focus of MSS, where it is shown that a set of strategy profiles X Ž . of a PRNF S, is a normal form information set for player i if and only Ž . if there exists an extensive form game without nature with PRNF S, with an information set h for player i such that the set of PRNF strategies Ž . that make h reachable is precisely X MSS, Theorem 1 .
The definition of normal form sequential equilibrium is obtained by replacing ''strategic independence'' with ''normal form information set'' in the definition of SIRE. Normal form sequential equilibrium is precisely sequential-in-every-tree, in the sense that the limit of a conditionally Ä n 4 convergent sequence P in a PRNF is a normal form sequential equilib-Ä n 4 rium if and only if P induces a sequential equilibrium in every extensive Ž . form with that PRNF MSS, Theorems 7 and 8 . While the lexicographic belief systems formulation of SIRE has a clear decision-theoretic charac-14 Ä n 4 Ž . Note that, since P is conditionally convergent, if 5 holds for all n, either Ä Ž n Ž < ..4 Ä Ž n Ž < ..4 E s , P и X F E r , P и X holds for all n sufficiently large, or the reverse
inequality holds for all n sufficiently large. 15 Since the statement and proof of Lemma 2 are still valid if strategic independence is replaced by normal form information set, a similar distinction holds between properness and normal form sequential equilibrium.
ter, the corresponding formulation of normal form sequential equilibrium Ž . does not see footnote 20 . Since any normal form information set for a player is also a strategic independence for that player, any SIRE is a normal form sequential equilibrium. 16 
DECISION-THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERNESS AND SIRE
Ž . In this section, we begin by briefly reviewing the Blume et al. 1991b notion of lexicographic probability systems. We then recall their characterization of properness in terms of an ordering induced by an LPS. 17 Finally, we show how that order can be modified to yield a characterization of SIRE.
Lexicographic Probability Systems
Consider a finite state space ⍀. In a game-theoretic context, the appropriate choice for ⍀ is S , S , or S. For example, the state space i yi when describing player i's beliefs about opponents' play is the space of strategy choices for the other players, S . Where convenient, we will yi define the concepts for an arbitrary state space ⍀.
DEFINITION 6. A lexicographic probability system on ⍀ is a K-tuple Ž 0 Ky1 . s , . . . , , for some integer K, of probability distributions on ⍀.
Ž . Blume et al. 1991b, p. 82 interpret an LPS as follows: ''The first component of the LPS can be thought of as representing the player's primary theory of how the game will be played, the second component the player's secondary theory, and so on.'' In a Nash equilibrium, players' primary theories about the play of the game will be correct and so 0 also i describes player i's behavior. 16 Since not every strategic independence is a normal form information set, the converse pendence for a player is also a normal form information set for that player if and only if Ž . S, satisfies transference of decision-maker indifference. Moreover, if the game satisfies transference of decision-maker indifference, strategic independence respecting equilibrium and normal form sequential equilibrium coincide.
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Ž . Blume et al. 1991a provide an axiomatic characterization of decision making that yields Ž . a subjective expected utility theory based on LPSs. Myerson's 1986 notion of a conditional Ž probability system which is equivalent to the notion of a lexicographic conditional probability . system, see footnote 21 is an alternative description of beliefs about out-of-equilibrium play.
Each player i has an LPS describing his or her beliefs about S . A Ž . r n ' r n , . . . , r n g 0, 1 and r n ª 0, such that the proba-Ž . bility distribution r n I is a product distribution for all n, where The first condition is the usual requirement that different players have the same beliefs about the behavior of other players. We let denote the i lexicographic belief system that players other than i hold on S . The i second condition ensures that player i believes that the other players are independently choosing strategies. 19 The third condition ensures that a player can evaluate the relative likelihood of any two strategy profiles chosen by the other players.
Every LPS induces a ''more likely than'' ordering:
The order G captures the ranking on states induced by the order in which these states appear in the levels of the belief systems. As usual, we have ) Ј if G Ј holds but Ј G does not; and s Ј if both G Ј and Ј G hold. The order ) is a complete and transitive order on ⍀. Loosely, if ) Ј, then is ''infinitely more likely'' than Ј under . Ž . Finally, given a lexicographic probability system, the number k r , s i i identifies the first level in the beliefs at which strategies r and s yi i i Ž . receive different payoffs, with k r , s s K if r and s agree at all levels.
These preliminaries in hand, we now turn to the respective orders characterizing proper equilibrium and SIRE.
Ky1 . The marginal of an LPS , . . . , is the LPS whose th probability distribution is the marginal of , s 0, . . . , K y 1.
19 Ž . Ž . Blume et al. 1991b , Proposition 1 show that as n ª ϱ, and hence r n ª 0, the Ä Ž . 4 sequence of probability distributions r n I ''captures'' the hierarchy of beliefs described by the LPS, in the sense that strategies are ranked the same by the LPS and expected Ä Ž . 4 ϱ Ž . payoffs under the sequence of probability distributions r n I see Proposition 4 . ns 1
Proper Equilibrium
The key to the LPS characterization of proper is the following order generated from the LPSs and payoffs: DEFINITION 8. Given a lexicographic probability system , the lexicographic order % on S is given by, for r , s g S ,
Note that % is a complete and transitive order. 
Strategic Independence Respecting Equilibrium
The LPS characterization of SIRE requires only a small modification to the lexicographic order used to characterize proper in Proposition 2. DEFINITION 9. Given a lexicographic probability system , the struc-Ž . tural partial order % on S is given by r % s if
for all -k r , s , r and s agree for player i on the support of
The structural order, like the lexicographic order, seeks the first level at which r and s receive different payoffs. However, the structural order i i than ranks the two strategies only if all preceding indifferences are structural, meaning that the indifferences are created by payoff ties in the normal form and hence would hold for any possible opponent strategy. As Ž . a result, % in general will only be a partial order unlike % . In but not structurally indifferent on the support of k .
yi
The structural order provides an intuitive characterization of SIRE.
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PROPOSITION 3. The strategy profile is a SIRE if and only if there is a lexicographic probability system with 0 s that satisfies the common prior assumption, strong independence, full support, and
We first formulate SIRE in terms of LPSs. Let denote the
where k s min : X ) 0 , and sim-
. It is immediate from the definitions that a strategy profile X yi is a SIRE if and only if there is a lexicographic probability system with 0 s that satisfies the common prior assumption, strong independence, full support, and for every player i and every strategic indepen-< < dence for player i, X, is a best reply to on X . We say that such
an LPS is a SIRE, or that it supports as a SIRE.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose X is a strategic independence for < < Ä Ž . 4 player i with not a best reply to . Let k ' min :
Since X is a strategic independence,
there exists r g X agreeing for i with t on X and agreeing for i with s
There is a similar characterization of normal form sequential equilibrium. The strategy profile is a normal form sequential equilibrium if and only if there is an LPS with 0 s that satisfies the common prior assumption, strong independence, full support, and
where r % s iff r % s and, for all -k r , s , r and s agree for all players on the
support of . The difficulty with this characterization is that the order % U requires player ᎏ yi S i to pay attention to the payoff structure of the other players, something that cannot be justified on purely decision-theoretic grounds. Moreover, there is no trembles-based characterization of % U analogous to the characterizations of % and % discussed in the next
where S _ X denotes the distribution conditional on S _ X and the
. in that case . Now, r and s agree for i on S _ X and so r % s . But
Fix r , s , and define X to be the smallest subset of S with the
property that r and s agree for i on S _ X . Now, r % s
is a strategic independence, s s 0, where k s
Thus, in a SIRE, strategies that rank higher in the payoff order % also S ᎏ rank higher in the behavior order ) . That is, players believe that player i Ž i is infinitely more likely to play r than s if player i's preferences as . described by % rank r ahead of s .
S i i ᎏ
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the decision-theoretic difference between SIRE and proper consists precisely of the difference between % S ᎏ and % . 21 Suppose that player i finds himself indifferent between strate-L ᎏ gies r and s , given that the opponents' play is described by . SIRE 
Proper equilibrium thus imposes more stringent requirements then does SIRE. Since % appeals any indifferences between strategies at a given level L ᎏ of beliefs to a higher level, while % appeals only indifferences that are S ᎏ structural, these orders, and hence SIRE and proper equilibrium, will coincide if all payoff ties arise out of structural indifferences. In particular, if is an LPS supporting 0 as a SIRE and the support of k is a singleton for each k, then supports 0 as a proper equilibrium. Figure 2 shows that a SIRE need not be proper. Since B weakly
equilibrium. However, normal form information sets and strategic inde-
21 One difference between the orders % and % is reflected in the ability, when using ᎏ ᎏ S L %, to work with an LPS whose various levels have disjoint supports. A lexicographic ᎏ S probability system is a lexicographic conditional probability system if the probability distribu-Ž 0 Ky1 . tions , . . . , have pairwise disjoint supports. An LPS is a SIRE if and only if the Ž . Ž < lexicographic conditional probability system defined by и s и S _ŷ
for all is a SIRE. A restriction to lexicographic conditional probability lyi systems is thus without loss of generality for the order % and SIRE. The same is not true ᎏ S Ž . for % and proper equilibria Blume et al., 1991b, p. 89 . gives best replies on all strategic independences and hence ensures that tie-preserving perturbations of payoffs. An example in which SIRE and proper do not coincide that cannot be destroyed by tie-preserving payoff perturbations is given in Fig. 3 . the lexicographic probability system is a SIRE. However, there exists no lexicographic probability system that will support this outcome as a proper equilibrium. To verify this, consider the specification of 1 that would be 2 required for properness. Since player 1 is indifferent between strategies A and D against 0 and A earns a higher payoff than D against 2 , 1 must 2 2 2 Ž attach a probability to ␦ higher than 0.25 otherwise A surely earns a . higher payoff than D, precluding indifference . But player 1 is also indifferent between strategies B and C, requiring 2 to attach a probabil-2 ity to ␥ higher than 0.75, a contradiction. 22 It is easy to show that a SIRE cannot attach positive weight to a pure strategy that is weakly dominated by another pure strategy, though it can attach positive probability to a pure strategy dominated by a mixed strategy. 23 This example is generic in the sense that any perturbations in payoffs that preserve the ties in player 1's payoffs yields a nearby SIRE that is not a proper equilibrium. The ties in player 2's payoffs appear for simplicity; they are not important to the example. There exist nearby specifications of player 2's payoffs that feature no ties and again yield a SIRE that is not proper. This example is then only nongeneric if one considers all perturbations in payoffs, including those that disrupt ties. First, note the following equivalence between lexicographic probability systems and probability sequences: Given an LPS satisfying common prior, Ä n 4 Ä Ž . 4 strong independence, and full support, P s r n I is a conditionally Ž Ä Ž .4 convergent probability sequence where r n is the sequence of vectors . n Ž . from strong independence . Moreover, P s r n I , so that, for s g S
k Ž . Ž and any k F min : s ) 0 , s s lim P s rŁ r n where
. we avoid division by zero by defining Ł r n ' 1 . In particular,
is a best reply to on X if and only if the
on X . Conversely, given a sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy i profiles and so, trivially, a sequence of completely mixed PRNF strategy Ä n 4 Ä m 4 Ä n 4 profiles, P , there exists an LPS such that a subsequence P of P m Ž .
Ä Ž .4 can be written as P s r m I for a sequence of vectors r m :
with r m ª 0 see Blume et al., 1991b , Proposition 2 .
Ä n 4 DEFINITION 10. The LPS and the probability sequence P are tail n Ž . equi¨alent if there exists n*, such that for n ) n*, P s r n I for some Ž . Ž . Ky1 Ž . r n g 0, 1 with r n ª 0.
The LPS and the probability sequence P n are limit equi¨alent if for all i g N, s , t g S , yi yi yi
Limit equivalence is less demanding than tail equivalence. For example, the sequence Ä n 4 generally, if the probability sequence P is tail equivalent to , then it is limit equivalent to and there exists n*, such that for n ) n*,
Ž Given an LPS with pairwise disjoint supports i.e., a lexicographic . conditional probability system, see footnote 21 , the payoffs to any two strategies, r and s , must be ranked the same way by P n for all i i y i sufficiently large n and for every probability sequence that is tail equivalent to . Hence, if r receives a higher payoff than s along some i i probability sequence that is tail equivalent to , then r receives a higher i payoff than s along e¨ery probability sequence that is tail equivalent to . i This is also true when the LPS does not have pairwise disjoint supports Ž . Proposition 4 below . The same does not hold for limit equivalence; it is easy to find two probability sequences that are limit equivalent to the same LPS but rank strategies differently. 4 n 4 n 4 n 4 n n n Ž . are both limit equivalent to , but the first gives a higher payoff to C than to A for large n 2 while the second gives a higher payoff to A than to C.
The lexicographic order induced by a lexicographic probability system ranks r ahead of s if and only if r receives a higher payoff than s along Ä n 4 only if for e¨ery probability sequence P tail equi¨alent to , there exists n* such that for all n ) n*, Blume et al. 1991b , Proposition 1 applies here Ž . with the modification that using their notation n* is chosen so that k Ž . Ž . n ) n* implies r n -r*᭙n ) n*, where r* solves 1 y r* B q r*W ) 0. B
The structural order can be similarly characterized, but the relevant probability sequences now consist of all limit equivalent sequences. In the Appendix we prove the following: Ä n 4 only if for e¨ery probability sequence P limit equi¨alent to , there exists n* such that for all n ) n*,
Propositions 4 and 5 describe the difference between tail and limit equivalence, and correspondingly between the lexicographic and structural orders, without reference to structural features of the game. Fix an LPS and suppose that every tail-equivalent probability sequence ranks r ahead i of s . Then r % s . However, r % s may fail to hold, as there may be i i L i i S i ᎏ limit-equivalent probability sequences that either fail to rank r and s or i i disagree in their ranking. 25 The structural order thus requires more stringent conditions than the lexicographic order to rank strategies and the structural order can decline to rank strategies that are ranked under the lexicographic order.
We can illustrate this difference by returning to Fig. 2 . Consider the 0 Ž . Ä n 4 is obvious that for any P converging to , B receives a higher payoff ranking is given along every term of any sequence that is tail equivalent to . The key here is that tail equivalence preserves any indifferences that appear at any level of beliefs in . In particular, a tail equivalent probability sequence is simply a collection of convex combinations of the distributions n , n s 1, . . . , k y 1, with the weight on k becoming arbitrarily 2 2 high relative to kq 1 . Using to evaluate strategies according to the 2 order % is then equivalent to looking at sequences of tail-equivalent L strategies.
Because player 1 has no information set or strategic independence that Ä 4 includes B and either C or D, and in which player 2's strategy set is L , the order % and hence SIRE does not rank B, C, and D. It is easy to S Ž . find sequences that are limit but not tail equivalent to in which either C or D gets a higher payoff than B along every element of the sequence. More generally, when must SIRE rank B ahead of C? A necessary condition must be that along every converging sequence of perturbed strategies, B does strictly better than C, since otherwise we can find limits in which C does at least as well as B and hence the SIRE need not rank B ahead of C. The proof of Proposition 5 involves showing that this condition is sufficient as well, by showing that if B fares better than C along every limit-equivalent sequence, then all indifferences between B and C must be structural indifferences, causing % to rank B ahead of C.
S
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide three results on the relationship between properness and sequential-in-every-tree. First, we show that properness is equivalent to quasi-perfect-in-every-tree. Since quasi-perfection is optimality along the sequence of perturbed strategies, while sequentiality is optimality in the limit, the distinction between properness and sequentialin-every-tree can be similarly phrased. Second, we provide a lexicographic probability system characterization of SIRE, the normal form implementation of sequential rationality. This characterization uses the structural Ž . order on a player's strategy space, denoted % . Blume et al. 1991b have S ᎏ a similar characterization of properness, based on the lexicographic order, % . The distinction between % and % describes the difference in the L S L decision theories that underlie sequential rationality and properness. Third, we give tremble-based characterizations of the orders % and % that S L do not involve structural features of the game, such as information sets or strategic independences.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The result is trivial if r and s agree for i on S . So suppose not. )⑀ n C y Cr3 y Cr3 s ⑀ n Cr3 ) 0.
Ž .Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ä n 4 ¥ Suppose for all P limit equivalent to and for n sufficiently large, 
